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Abstract—DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
encrypt DNS to guard user privacy by hiding DNS resolutions
from passive adversaries. Yet, past attacks have shown that en-
crypted DNS is still sensitive to traffic analysis. As a consequence,
RFC 8467 proposes to pad messages prior to encryption, which
heavily reduces the characteristics of encrypted traffic. In this
paper, we show that padding alone is insufficient to counter DNS
traffic analysis. We propose a novel traffic analysis method that
combines size and timing information to infer the websites a user
visits purely based on encrypted and padded DNS traces. To this
end, we model DNS sequences that capture the complexity of
websites that usually trigger dozens of DNS resolutions instead
of just a single DNS transaction. A closed world evaluation
based on the Alexa top-10k websites reveals that attackers can
deanonymize at least half of the test traces in 80.2% of all
websites, and even correctly label all traces for 32.0% of the
websites. Our findings undermine the privacy goals of state-of-
the-art message padding strategies in DoT/DoH. We conclude by
showing that successful mitigations to such attacks have to remove
the entropy of inter-arrival timings between query responses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the inherent starting
point of nearly all Internet traffic, including sensitive communi-
cation. However, despite its vast popularity, the DNS standards
explicitly do not address well-known privacy concerns. As
a consequence, in traditional DNS, passive adversaries can
easily sniff on name resolutions, and for example, trivially
identify the Web services that users aim to visit. Eavesdroppers
can use this information for advertisement targeting, or to
create nearly-perfect profiles of the browsing/usage behavior
of their clients. While we seem to have accepted this lack
of DNS privacy for years, recently, the IETF standardized
two new protocols that aim to protect user privacy in DNS.
Both proposals, DNS over TLS (DoT) [26] and DNS over
HTTPS (DoH) [24], wrap the DNS communication between
DNS client and resolver in an encrypted stream (either TLS
or HTTPS) to hide the client’s name resolution contents from
passive adversaries.
These privacy-preserving protocols have seen rapid and
wide adoption. Many prominent open DNS resolvers started
to support DoT or DoH, such as Cloudflare, Quad9, or
Google Public DNS. Likewise, several popular DNS resolver
implementations (e.g., Bind, PowerDNS, Unbound) offer DoT
and/or DoH functionality [9]. Similarly, these new standards
have been adopted on the client side. Most prominently,
Google deployed DoT for all Android 9 devices [34], and
Mozilla started to support DoH in Firefox 62 [39]. Further-
more, vendors have announced support in more popular clients
for the near future, such as in Chrome [5]. These developments
towards encrypted DNS will help to preserve privacy (and
integrity) of DNS communication, and thus have the potential
to close a long-lived, staggering privacy gap.
Yet, similar to other privacy-preserving communication
systems that leverage encryption (e.g., HTTPS [46], [56] or
Tor [41], [50], [54]), DoT and DoH are susceptible to traffic
analysis. Gillmor’s empirical measurements [19] show that
passive adversaries can leverage the mere size of a single en-
crypted DNS transaction to narrow down the queried domain.
Such size-based traffic analysis attacks were expected in the
according standards, and it is thus not surprising that the IETF
seeked for countermeasures. Most prominently, RFC 8467 [38]
follows Gillmor’s suggestions to pad DNS queries and re-
sponses to multiples of 128 bytes and 468 bytes, respectively.
It is widely assumed that this padding strategy is a reasonable
trade-off between privacy and communication overhead [19].
In fact, popular DoT/DoH implementations (e.g., BIND, Knot)
and open resolvers (e.g., Cloudflare) heavily rely on these
current best practices, although still in experimental state.
In this paper, we study the privacy guarantees of this
widely-deployed DoT/DoH padding strategy. We assume a
passive adversary (e.g., ISP)—notably not the DNS resolver
itself—who aims to deanonymize the DNS resolutions of
a Web client. We follow the observation that modern Web
services are ubiquitously intertwined. When visiting a website,
clients leave DNS traces that go beyond individual DNS
transactions. While the suggested padding strategy destroys the
length entropy of individual messages, we assess to what extent
DNS resolution sequences (e.g., caused by third-party content
embedded into Web services) allow adversaries to reveal the
Web target. Such sequences not only reflect characteristic se-
ries of DNS message sizes, but also expose timing information
between DNS transactions within the same sequence.
Based on this information, we propose a method to measure
the similarity between two DNS message sequences. We then
leverage a k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier to search for
the most similar DNS transactions sequences in a previously-
trained model. We leverage this classifier to assess if attackers
can reveal the website a used visited purely by inspecting
the DNS message sequence. Our closed world evaluation
based on the Alexa top-10k websites reveals that attackers
can deanonymize five out of ten test traces in 80.2% of
all websites, and correctly label all traces for 32.0% of the
websites. We measure the false classification rate in an open
world scenario and show that attackers can limit the false
classification rate to 10% while retaining true positive rates of
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40%. Even classifying DNS sequences that exclude assumed-
to-be-cached DNS records can preserve the classifier’s accu-
racy if such partially cached sequences are included in the
training dataset. Overall, our results show that adversaries can
reveal the content of encrypted and padded DNS traffic of Web
clients, which so far was believed to be impossible.
Our findings undermine the privacy goals of state-of-the-
art message padding strategies in DoT/DoH. This is highly
critical, especially when seen in light of recent orthogonal
initiatives to anonymize Web services, ranging from HTTPS
Everywhere to encrypting domains in SNI [45]). Admittedly,
DNS is not the only—and with DoT/DoH certainly not the
easiest—angle to reveal the communication target. In fact, IP
addresses of endpoints, traffic analysis of HTTPS traffic [46],
[56], and even plaintext domain information in TLS’s SNI are
(currently) easier targets to reveal the Web services a client
visits. However, DoT/DoH were designed with clear privacy
guarantees in mind, and it is crucial that we have a thorough
understanding whether these promises can be kept up.
Seeing this loss in privacy, we thus discuss countermea-
sures against sequence-based DNS traffic analysis. We show
that even an optimal (i.e., overly aggressive) padding strategy
does not provide sufficient privacy guarantees. Instead, we
find that countermeasures also have to reduce the entropy of
inter-arrival timings between query responses. We thus propose
to extend padded encrypted DNS with countermeasures that
mitigate timing side channels. In particular, we show that both
constant-rate sending and Adaptive Padding [47] preserve DNS
privacy. Our prototypical implementation demonstrates their
effect as a trade-off for bandwidth and timing overheads.
Summarizing, we provide the following contributions:
1) We illustrate a traffic analysis attack that leverages DNS
transaction sequences to reveal the website a client visits,
as opposed to existing deanonymization attempts that
consider only individual transactions and can easily be
mitigated by message padding.
2) We provide an extensive analysis of the privacy guaran-
tees offered by DNS message padding (RFC 8467 [38])
against our attack in a Web browsing context. We demon-
strate severe privacy losses even against passive adver-
saries that sniff on encrypted and padded DNS traffic only.
3) We evaluate alternative padding strategies and constant-
rate communication systems against our proposed attack.
We reveal that even perfect padding cannot mitigate traffic
analysis, and show that any promising countermeasure
will have to lower the entropy of timing information.
II. BACKGROUND
DNS is one of the most fundamental protocols on the
Internet. As its primary use case, DNS allows online services
to expose domain names that can easily be remembered by
clients and which, upon request, will be translated into IP
addresses. Upon visiting a website, users query DNS resolvers,
typically even for multiple domain names to load third-party
Web content. The DNS resolver either has the answer cached,
or performs an iterative lookup by relaying the query to
Authoritative Name Servers (AuthNSs), which can then answer
the DNS lookup. The response then flows back from the
AuthNS to the DNS resolver, subsequently, to the user/client.
In this work, we focus on name resolutions, DNS’s pre-
dominant use case. In general, DNS also forms the basis for
several other key ingredients of the Internet. There are many
email anti-spam methods, such as DKIM [35], SPF [33], DNS-
based blacklists [10], TLS certificate pinning (DANE) [16],
[25], and even identity provider protocols (ID4me) [30].
A. Security Assessment of DNS
For years, DNS deployments did not foresee any means to
protect the integrity and confidentiality of DNS messages. The
lack of integrity has allowed for manipulation attempts, such as
malicious captive portals or redirecting non-existing domains
to malicious websites. Worse, without integrity protection, an
attacker could alter the DNS resolution for critical websites,
such as banks, and redirect visitors to launch phishing attempts.
By now, the increasing deployment of DNSSEC [2], [13]
allows an AuthNS to cryptographically sign DNS responses
to prevent that attackers can spoof or manipulate responses
before they reach the DNS resolver.
While DNSSEC ensures message integrity, it explicitly
does not provide confidentiality guarantees. As a consequence,
in plain DNS (even with DNSSEC), both queries and responses
leak the requested domain names. This has severe privacy
implications, such as leaking the browsing history of users
to any party who can observe the DNS communication, such
as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), attackers sniffing on
unencrypted Wi-Fi traffic, or other on-path attackers.
B. Encrypted DNS
Users are understandably worried about privacy in DNS-
based name resolutions. One particular critical path is between
the client and the resolver, where several entities such as the
ISP might sniff on the communication. To close this gap, in
the last years, various proposals evolved to encrypt the DNS
communication between clients and recursive resolvers [11],
[24], [27], [26], [44]. The common element of all proposals is
to encrypt and authenticate the DNS traffic to guarantee both,
client-to-resolver integrity and confidentiality. Among these
approaches there are two predominantly deployed proposals,
which mostly differ in their transport protocol:
DNS over TLS (DoT) is specified in RFC 7858 [26] from
March 2016. It takes the existing DNS over TCP protocol and
wraps it into a TLS layer. DNS over TCP is specified as part
of the original DNS RFCs, RFC 1035 [40], and is supported
by all major DNS resolver implementations. Supporting DoT,
besides adding a TLS stack, requires only minor changes to
DNS implementations. The specification also allows for an
opportunistic encryption mode, in which the identity of the
DNS server cannot be verified, but encryption is still used,
thus providing protection against passive network attackers.
DoT is well-suited for a system-wide DNS service such as the
stub resolvers of operating systems. For example, Android 9
introduces a system-wide DoT resolver [34].
DNS over HTTPS (DoH) is a more recent proposal from
October 2018 and is specified in RFC 8484 [24]. It contains
two different approaches, based on the HTTP GET and POST
methods. The GET method uses a URI with a parameter in the
form of https://dnsserver.example/?dns=<DNS_
in_base64> where “<DNS_in_base64>” represents a
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base64 encoding of a DNS message in DNS wire format.
In the case of HTTP POST, the DNS request is part of the
HTTP message body in DNS wire format. Regardless of the
request method, the DNS reply is sent in the HTTP message
body in wire format. As of time of writing, this is the only
standardized response format, but RFC 8484 [24] allows for
future extensions. Given its HTTP focus, interest in DoH stems
largely from browser vendors. As such, both Firefox 62+ [39]
and Chromium-based browsers already support DoH [4], [5].
C. Threat Model of DoT/DoH
Encrypted DNS aims to guarantee confidentiality under the
assumption that the resolver is trusted. Both DoT and DoH
secure the communication between a DNS client and the DNS
resolver only. This threat model aims to protect against on-
path attackers such as ISPs, Wi-Fi access points, or Internet
Exchange Points. Trusting the DNS resolver is essential. As
the DNS resolver still sees all requests, it can trivially break
confidentiality and integrity. The user thus has to carefully
choose a resolvers with a privacy policy they like and trust.
While it does not protect privacy, to guarantee integrity, clients
can perform DNSSEC validation on top of encrypted DNS.
Note that all upstream communication of the resolver
(towards AuthNSs) is not covered by DoT/DoH and remains
plain DNS. The ISP of the DNS resolver and any upstream
on-path attacker (between resolver and AuthNSs) can still see
the iterative lookups. Yet this privacy impact is less severe, as
resolvers mix the queries of many clients giving some weak
notion of group anonymity, which makes it difficult to map
clients to queries. In addition, the resolvers cache responses
of all their clients globally, and thus not every client query
will be visible to the ISP. In this paper, we will follow this
threat model and assume a passive attacker that can observe
the communication between a DNS client and its resolver.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THREAT MODEL
Encrypting DNS communication, as in DoT and DoH,
strongly increases user privacy. Yet: Which privacy guarantees
do users of these new standards obtain with regard to potential
side channels? In this work, we investigate how much an
attacker can learn by side-channel analysis on encrypted and
padded DNS traffic. Following the threat model of encrypted
DNS schemes, our honest-but-curious attacker passively sniffs
(TLS/HTTPS-encapsulated) DNS traffic between the client and
its resolver to infer which websites the user visits. Such an
attacker might be an ISP, a VPN hoster, or a Wi-Fi operator
trying to monetize user profiles. Our attacker does not delay,
alter, or inject data into the user’s traffic. However, they may
perform stateful analysis. Finally, we assume that the attacker
can initiate their own network connections from the same
network-topological location as the attack victim—a trivially
satisfied assumption in the Wi-Fi and ISP setting. This final
assumption enables the attacker to create a training dataset that
accurately represents the client’s perspective.
Our concrete attack scenario is that we investigate if
encrypted and padded DNS helps to hide which website a
user visits. We assume a passive adversary that can investigate
encrypted and padded DNS traffic between the client and
its resolver only. Following the threat model of DoT/DoH
(Section II-C), we explicitly define trivial attacks such as
sniffing on the resolver’s upstream communication as out of
scope. Furthermore, we assume that the user picks a trusted
DNS resolver that does not breach user privacy. We choose
Web browsing as the one use case of our privacy analysis, as
it is the most common use case for casual computer usage.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We now present how traffic analysis can infer the browsing
target purely based on encrypted DNS traffic. We start by
discussing if traffic analysis can still infer message contents
despite the fact that the encrypted DNS messages are padded.
Then, we present DNS sequences, a new data structure that
derives features from encrypted DNS traffic. Finally, we pro-
pose a k-NN classifier that uses a custom distance metric that
reveals which website visit has caused a given DNS sequence.
A. Traffic Analysis and DNS Padding
Encrypted DNS does not leave many characteristics that
can be leveraged to infer the communication content. In fact,
we can observe features in three dimensions, namely (i) counts,
such as packets, (ii) sizes, such as overall transmitted bytes,
and (iii) time. Naturally, combinations of these characteristics
are possible, e.g., bursts, which measure the packets per
time interval. These three dimensions—despite encryption—
may provide valuable hints about the communication content.
For example, the strings “en.wikipedia.org” and “bit.ly” are
easily discernible by their length. To increase privacy, one can
thus reduce the aforementioned dimensions. Most importantly,
RFC 7830 [37] provides a mechanism to pad the size of DNS
messages to a fixed length, by adding a new extension type to
EDNS [6]. RFC 8467 [38] recommends padding all queries to a
multiple of 128B, while all responses are padded to a multiple
of 468B. This way, padding largely unifies byte counts and
reduces one dimension for traffic analysis. RFC 8467 [38]
follows the work of Gillmor [19], who empirically studied
the effects of various padding strategies based on a sample of
recorded DNS traffic. Based on this, RFC 8467 [38] suggests
a padding strategy that is a trade-off between bandwidth
overhead and the risk of privacy violations. Several popular
DoT/DoH implementations (e.g., BIND, Knot) and public
resolvers (e.g., Cloudflare1) thus already rely on this
padding strategy, and we expect that others will follow.
B. DNS Sequences
Gillmor chose the padding recommendations after studying
the privacy implications for individual query-response pairs.
However, as we will show, attackers can leverage a sequence
of DNS query/response pairs instead, which heavily increases
the uniqueness compared to individual DNS transactions.
These sequences of DNS queries occur for different reasons
during Web browsing, such as redirects, loading of third-party
resources, or resources from subdomains, all of which can
only happen after the initial GET request, thus forming a
dependency between DNS queries. As we will show, these
sequences characterize a website a user visited quite well.
1https://dnsprivacy.org/jenkins/job/dnsprivacy-monitoring/ (see “Padding”)
3
We thus use a DNS sequence data structure as the core
representation to perform traffic analysis. Such a DNS se-
quence abstractly captures sizes (Msg) and inter-arrival times
(Gap) of DNS messages. Before going into details, we will
use an example to illustrate the basics of the underlying
idea. Consider a visit to wikiquote.org which triggers
four DNS requests/responses upon visit: (i) at the start:
wikiquote.org (ii) after 287ms: www.wikiquote.org
(iii) and after 211ms: both meta.wikimedia.org and
upload.wikimedia.org simultaneously. The resulting
DNS sequence (which ignores requests) looks like this:
Msg(1), Gap(8), Msg(1), Gap(7), Msg(1), Msg(1)
All responses are 468B large, and there are 287ms and
211ms time between them, respectively. The DNS sequence
encodes the four DNS responses (each 468B long, i.e., exactly
one padding block). If there is a time gap between two
responses, we note this gap and its magnitude. To be less
susceptible to timing variations due to typical jitter, we express
the time in log scale (e.g., blog2(287)c = 8) instead of accurate
numbers. There is no Gap between the last two Msgs, as they
arrive (almost) simultaneously. That is, we neglect all time
gaps with a numerical value ≤ 0 (i.e., those shorter than 1ms).
We choose to focus on downstream DNS communication
(DNS replies) only. That is, we extract our features from the
data stream from the DNS resolver to the client only. There
are several reasons why we chose this design. First, in a test
of popular domains, based on the Alexa domain list [1], we
found that all DNS requests are sufficiently small to be padded
to the same size of 128B. This is the smallest padding size
for a request and it shows that requests provide little entropy.
Second, the timing of requests is also highly correlated with
the timing of the responses, as most queries will be cached by
the DNS resolver. Thus, one round-trip time after the query,
the response can be seen on the wire. Furthermore, in the face
of reordering, it is impossible to reliably correlate responses to
queries in case of multiple (equally-looking) parallel queries.
Overall, our focus on replies simplifies the design, while it
retains the traffic characteristics.
In order to represent message sizes and timestamps, we
opted for an abstract notion of size and time. This provides
higher flexibility to generalize different implementations and
events outside of our control (e.g., network performance,
jitter). Technically, instead of exact response sizes, we are only
interested in the padding group the message belongs to, i.e.,
which multiple of 468B was used for padding. Furthermore,
we compute the differences in the message timestamps to
create a coarse-grained estimate of how long the gap to the
previous DNS response was. Decreasing the granularity of
times increases robustness against changing timings, e.g., due
to different bandwidth limits, network conditions, or hardware
configurations. We thus infer the rounded logarithmic time
differences between two consecutive DNS replies:
gapi(ti−1, ti) = blog2(ti − ti−1)c.
Knowing the DNS message sizes and their time gaps, both
of which can be extracted from encrypted and padded DNS
traffic, enables us to create a DNS sequence that characterizes
a website. Formally, a DNS sequence is a list of n elements
(e1, . . . , en). An element ei is part of the set {Msg(j) | j ∈
N+} ∪ {Gap(j) | j ∈ N+}. The values j are used as indicators
of the original DNS message sizes and inter-arrival times;
higher j’s correlate with larger sizes and longer gaps.
C. DNS Sequence Extraction
As DNS sequences only rely on coarse-grained statistical
features, we can derive them even from encrypted and padded
traffic. Starting from a network traffic recording, we can
first filter out non-DNS traffic. Several identifiers show if a
connection carries DNS data, such as ports (853 for DoT), IP
addresses (e.g., 9.9.9.9), the TLS handshake (extensions and
cipher suites or Server Name Indication (SNI)) [28], [29], or
DNS-like traffic characteristics (packets sizes of 468B). In our
implementation, we assume that we can apply an IP address
and port based filter, which has proven to work perfectly for
all major resolvers in practice.
Then, we reassemble the TCP streams of the identified
connections and keep TLS records of type “application data”.
Processing the TLS records requires a bit of data cleanup.
Some TLS implementations use a single TLS record to fit
a whole DNS packet, which makes size extraction easy. For
others, the TLS record is limited to the underlying segment
size. In this case, we can combine the sizes of consecutive TLS
records if we detect that they are split at a segment boundary.
The segment boundary split can be detected by comparing the
size of the TCP segment and checking if it is just below the
maximum transfer unit (MTU) of the underlying IP packet.
Since TLS 1.3 the certificate is encrypted before transmission.
We need to avoid interpreting it as TLS payload, but it can
easily be identified and ignored, as it is the first record after the
“change cipher spec” message. Lastly, the overhead of the TLS
and potentially HTTP communication must be known, such
that DNS message size extraction can correct for it. The TLS
cipher and authentication scheme are transmitted in plain text,
while the HTTP overhead can be learned by sending queries
to the DoH server. At the end, we keep the message sizes and
inter-arrival times of our DNS messages.
D. DNS Sequence Classifier
We now use DNS sequences to build a classifier that
determines if an unknown DNS sequence “equals” a previously
recorded (and labeled) DNS sequence. We leverage k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN), a simple machine learning algorithm that
allows us to easily interpret and inspect the classification
decisions. To determine if two DNS sequences are the same,
our classifier requires a distance function that measures how
similar two objects are. In the following, we will describe this
distance function, formalize our k-NN classifier and explain
how it behaves for ambiguous classifications.
1) Comparing DNS Sequences: It is important for our
classifier to have a distance function which allows operating on
DNS sequences with differing lengths. One such established
function is the Damerau-Levenshtein distance [7], [36] or edit
distance. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance counts the num-
ber of edit operations to turn one sequence into another based
on the intuition of similar sequences requiring fewer edits.
It uses four basic operations: insertion, deletion, substitution,
and transposition of neighboring places. We instantiate these
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TABLE I. SUMMARY OF EDIT OPERATIONS APPLICABLE TO OUR DNS
SEQUENCE DURING DISTANCE CALCULATION. THE VALUE COLUMN
CONTAINS THE CONCRETE VALUE, AS DETERMINED THROUGH THE
HYPER-PARAMETER GRID SEARCH IN SECTION V-C.
Operation Cost Value
Insert Msg(i) cinsMsg(i) 12
Insert Gap(i) cinsGap(i) i ∗ 1
Delete Same as Insert Same as Insert
Substitute
Msg(i)→Msg(j) csubstMsg(i, j)
cinsMsg(i)+cinsMsg(j)
4
Substitute
Gap(i)→Gap(j) csubstGap(i, j) |i− j| ∗ 3
Substitute
Gap(i)→Msg(j)
Msg(j)→Gap(i)
csubstGapMsg(i, j) cinsGap(i) + cinsMsg(j)
Swap x with y
{
cswap x 6= y
0 else
{
3 x 6= y
0 else
four operations for both sequence element types, i.e., gaps and
messages. This way, we can transform any DNS sequence into
another DNS sequence, and the distance reflects the costs of
a transformation.
In its basic setting, the edit distance uses a fixed cost for
each edit operation. Unfortunately, this does not necessarily
reflect the importance of multi-typed elements in our DNS
sequence. Timing information is volatile and depends on many
factors outside of our control, such as network performance.
We argue that a slight difference in timing (e.g., a change
Gap(2) ⇒ Gap(3)) should affect the similarity less than
a full additional DNS response. In contrast, the number of
DNS queries send by the client and therefore also the number
of responses should be rather constant, given the same ini-
tial configuration of the client and website. To reflect these
specifics of DNS sequences, we will assign weighted costs
that depend on the elements being edited. Table I summarizes
the edit operation of our DNS sequence distance measure. We
will determine the concrete values for all cost parameters in
Section V-C.
2) Formalization of k-NN: Our k-NN classifier assigns a
label to unlabeled DNS sequences, based on the labels of
the nearest neighbors. This works on the assumption that
sequences are similar to and have smaller distances to those
traces generated from the same domain than to DNS sequences
of other domains. The parameter k ∈ N tells how many
neighbors to consider. This value is usually odd to help tie-
breaking. Our classifier is trained on a set of labeled DNS
sequences LS. We have a set of labels L, with a single label
noted li, each corresponding to a website on the Internet. A
DNS sequence, named dsi, is part of the set DS of all DNS
sequences.
We will be using two variations of k-NN. The first variant,
knn(k, u, LS)→ (L×DS), is the traditional k-NN, where
given an unlabeled DNS sequence u ∈ DS, a set of labeled
DNS sequences LS ⊂ (L×DS) : {(l0, ds0), . . . , (ln, dsn)},
and a distance function dist(ds0, ds1)→ R+0 , it returns a result
set LSres of the closest neighbors. The result set LSres ⊆ LS
is a subset of LS containing up to k entries. All elements in
LSres fulfill the property, that there is no element with smaller
distance, but other elements with equal distance may exist:
∀(li, dsi) ∈ LSres.
dist(u, dsi) ≤ min
(lj ,dsj)∈(LS\LSres)
{dist(u, dsj)}.
The second variant, knnthres(k, u, LS)→ (L×DS), ex-
tends the previous one, by introducing a threshold function
determining if the result is sufficiently close to the search
candidate. The unconstrained (first) k-NN variant may find
nearest neighbors whose distance to the search candidate is
significant. This, in particular, happens if we search for DNS
sequences of websites that were not part of our training
phase, e.g., in an open world scenario. In such a case, we
are not interested in an arbitrary most similar result, but
rather want to know whether or not the closest hits are a
good classification result. We thus define an indicator function
thres(u, ds) → {0, 1}, which returns 1, if and only if u and
ds are sufficiently close (otherwise, ds /∈ LSres). The exact
choice for thres will be defined in Section V-D2.
3) Tie-Breaking: Regardless of the k-NN variant, there is
no guarantee that all labels in LSres are equal. In fact, k-NN
can return many contradicting labels. In this case, we perform
a tie-breaking step to pick a single label out of the set of
possibilities. To this end, we first test if any label occurs in
the majority and/or plurality of cases, and if so, pick this label.
Otherwise, we choose the label with the smallest distance to
the search candidate under all labels which occurred most
often, yet not in a plurality of cases. We will call these pseudo-
pluralities as they are a plurality only given that their vote
counts more than the votes of other equally-sized groups (due
to their minimum distance). In our evaluation, we differentiate
between these tie-breaking rules. This provides more insights
into how similar the labels are, thus how well the classification
works, and how much tie breaking is necessary. Summarizing,
the overall tie-breaking strategies are (from strict to flexible):
Unanimous: All labels returned by k-NN are identical.
Majority: One label occurs in over half of the cases.
Plurality: One label occurs more often than any other label
but is not a majority.
Pseudo-Plurality: Under all the labels with the highest count,
choose the single label with the minimum distance to the
search candidate. This happens if two or more labels have
the same highest count, so no plurality exists. If multiple
labels have the same smallest distance, no result can be
found.
These tie-breaking strategies build on each other such that each
“unanimous” is also a “majority” and each “majority” is also
a “plurality”. The less strict ones can assign a label, if the
stricter ones cannot.
V. EVALUATION
We will now evaluate the efficacy of our proposed method-
ology to classify DNS sequences that we obtain from traffic
captures. We introduce three evaluation scenarios that assess
our classifier both in a closed and in an open world scenario.
A. Scenarios
In the following, we specify these scenarios, which infor-
mation the attacker has, and which aspect of our implemen-
tation will be tested. All websites described in the following
scenarios are taken from the Alexa domain list [1] (released
on 2018-11-14).
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1) Scenario 1: Closed World: The closed world scenario
is the easiest for the attacker. Here, the attacker knows all
websites that a client might visit. Every website can be trained
on and the decision only has to be which of the known websites
the client visited. This setup suites the first k-NN variant (no
threshold function) best, as the attacker does not run the risk
of classifying non-trained samples. Instead, the attacker can
opportunistically search for the most similar DNS sequence(s).
Our closed world dataset consists of the top 10 000 web-
sites. For each website, we collected ten samples in parallel
to reduce temporal effects on the samples. We started the
measurements on 2018-11-26 and they took 50 hours. The
remaining websites repeatedly caused errors and repeated
measurements also could not succeed. We only include traces
for websites for which all ten DNS traces were retrieved suc-
cessfully, which resulted in traces for 9205 websites. Details
about the measurement setup and how we handle errors are in
Section V-B.
2) Scenario 2: Open World: The open world scenario
extends the closed world scenario in how adversaries would
observe DNS traffic in practice. Here, the attacker only knows
a subset of the websites that the client visits. This complicates
the task for the attacker, as they cannot include all relevant
websites in the training phase. The attacker now not only has
to find the most similar DNS sequence, but also has to decide
whether this closest sequence is actually suitable. This scenario
is much more realistic, as it is impossible to determine all
websites a user might want to visit. In the open world scenario,
we thus use k-NN with a threshold function which can neglect
results if they are “too far away” from the classification input.
To reflect an open world scenario, we split the closed world
dataset in two partitions. The top-ranked 1000 websites are
used for training the classifier, whereas the sites with Alexa
ranks 1001 to 10 000 are used for testing for false positives.
Excluding websites with erroneous traces, this results in 956
websites for training and 8249 websites for testing.
3) Scenario 3: Cache Effects: DNS caches drastically
affect which domains need to be resolved, and thus change
the DNS sequences. We measure these caching effects by
repeatedly visiting the same website with different cache
contents. To reflect (nearly) empty caches, we only preload
the TLDs and visit the websites. To represent filled caches,
we visit websites after preloading the cache with popular third-
party domains. Combining both data allows us to measure if an
attacker can even fingerprint DNS contents if DNS sequences
are (partially) cached.
For this scenario, we collect the top 10 000 websites once
with the normal list of only effective TLDs and once with the
extended DNS cache preload list. The extended list contains
the most common third-party domains we observed in the
closed world dataset. We selected all third-party domains
which were used in more than 15% of domains for a total of
42. We think simulating caching through the DNS stub resolver
is a fair way to simulate it, as it will remove all outgoing DNS
messages. Preloading the browser cache is harder, as frequently
the same resource, like jQuery, can appear in many versions,
and all of them would need to be preloaded. We can only take
into account websites that loaded successfully for both runs,
leaving us with 8764 websites to compare.
B. Measurement Setup
To bootstrap our evaluation, we created a setup to learn
DNS sequences of websites. All tests are performed on a server
with a E5-2683 v4 64-core CPU with 2.10GHz and 128GB of
main memory. The server runs a Debian 9.6 with Linux 4.18.6
and is connected using a 10GB/s network interface.
There are three parties involved in DNS resolution: the
browser, the local stub resolver, and the DNS resolver. To
record DNS sequences, we run 35 Docker containers in
parallel, each running a Google Chrome 70 browser and an
Unbound [52] (version 1.7.1) DNS stub resolver. We chose
Unbound, as it is already a popular choice for many Linux
distributions, widely tested, and supports the dnstap [14] log-
ging functionality. Being a stub resolver, Unbound caches DNS
responses to speed up repeated queries, but will not perform the
full iterative DNS lookup procedure. Instead, it will forward all
queries to an upstream recursive DNS resolver. Here, we resort
to Cloudflare’s resolvers at 1.0.0.1 and 1.1.1.1, given their
support for DoT and documented performance [43].
To capture a DNS sequence, we first start Unbound and
Chrome. Then, we flush and preload Unbound’s DNS cache
with NS entries for all TLDs and effective TLDs based on
the Alexa [1] domains we use. Our assumption here is that
a user will have these records cached due to past resolutions
in the same TLD space. Flushing the cache is important, as
the Chrome start-up causes some DNS queries itself, which
could alter the behavior later on. Flushing makes the tests
repeatable as we always have the same starting conditions.
We then navigate Chrome to the website we want to generate
a DNS sequence for. We let the website load for a total of
30 seconds or up to seven seconds of inactivity according to
messages in Chrome’s DevTool Protocol [8]. Every network
event (outgoing and incoming data) and script parse event
(script files and eval) resets the inactivity timer.
To create a DNS sequence, we convert the dnstap log file
into a DNS sequence by padding DNS responses to a multiple
of 468B. We label each DNS sequence with the website it was
generated from. Note that an actual on-path attacker would
have to follow methodologies described in Section IV-C to
extract DNS traces from network traces. However, we chose
dnstap as the source for traces, as it greatly simplifies our
experimental setups. In fact, converting dnstap logs into DNS
traces is semantically close to extracting DNS messages from
the wire capture after TLS record processing. Calculating
the gap sizes and abstracted message sizes is analogous to
Section IV-C. However, to assess potential bias, Section V-E
will compare the classification results from dnstap-based traces
with those of traces extracted from TLS traces.
Some websites on the Alexa list only perform a redirect
to other domains. One reason are domains, which are abbre-
viated for quicker typing, and only redirect to the spelled out
form, e.g., the American Airlines domain aa.com. Another
common occurrence are websites with multiple TLDs and
redirecting to the correct language version based on IP address
or browser configuration. In such cases, where an identical
website is hosted under different domains, we create a single
label for all of these websites.
To minimize errors in data collection, we test if a website
loaded properly. To this end, we add special marker DNS
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queries directly before and after loading the website, to ensure
that we can reliable separate the DNS queries related to the
experiment. We then analyze the dnstap files, ensure that
the marker queries are contained, and check that other DNS
traffic occurred. Using the DevTool Protocol, we filter for error
messages, which indicate a DNS or connection failure. Lastly,
we check for DNS traces that are outliers when compared to
other traces of the same website. This helps to detect cases
of slow network connections which led to a spurious timeout
or cases where websites demanded CAPTCHA completions to
continue. In all such erroneous cases, we repeat the measure-
ments up to two times, and discard the websites if no consistent
data could be retrieved.
C. Parameter Selection
Our classifier requires a few parameter values that specify
the weights for the distance function and how many neighbors
should be searched for (i.e., k). Choosing good constants
will have a large impact on the classification results. Con-
sequently, we select these parameters using a hyperparameter
optimization. We choose to perform a grid search on the closed
world (Scenario 1) dataset. The dataset has ten labeled traces
per websites, making 10-fold cross-validation a fitting choice.
Since the grid search is CPU heavy, and we do not want
to over-fit our classifier, we select 5000 randomly chosen
websites from the closed world dataset for cross-validation.
We choose the parameters based on the best 10-fold cross-
validation results given a fixed k = 1. The concrete values for
each edit operation are also listed in Table I. We describe the
distances between traces in more detail in Section A and show
how distances are distributed.
D. Evaluation Results
We will now describe the evaluation results of all scenarios
that we have previously introduced.
1) Scenario 1: Closed World: The closed world scenario
is the easiest of the scenarios and it will show the best case
performance we can expect. This is a fully labeled dataset
which allows us to use cross-validation to measure how good
our classifier is. Concretely, we will be employing 10-fold
cross-validation between all the DNS sequences. Since we have
exactly ten DNS sequences per website, we try to classify one
DNS sequence based on the other nine in the training set. This
effectively limits our choice of k to the range of one to nine.
Figure 1 shows the effect of k on the performance of
the classification. The plot shows the percentage of correctly
classified DNS sequences out of the 92 050 sequences in total.
Irregardless of k, we can classify over 75% of DNS sequences
correctly. Since the accuracy of even k’s is even worse than
for odd k’s, such that we exclude them from further analysis.
The accuracy differs between 76.4% for k = 1 to the best
k = 7 with 78.1% and is overall very stable. We also observe
that more tie-breaking is necessary for higher k’s. This is
intuitive, as tie-breaking only becomes important for k > 1.
The results also demonstrate the utility of pseudo-plurality, as
majority/plurality alone does not reach the accuracy of k = 1.
Looking from the per-website perspective, we can see
that classification performs well for most of the 10 traces.
Figure 2 shows how many of the 10 traces per website we
Fig. 1. Effect of k in Scenario 1 (Closed World). The y-axis shows the
fraction of correctly-labeled DNS sequences. Colors denote the tie-breaking
strategy.
Fig. 2. Per website results for fixed k = 7 in Scenario 1 (Closed World).
The y-axis shows the percentage of websites we can re-identify in how many
of the 10 data points (x-axis).
recognize correctly for k = 7, again broken down by tie-
breaking strategy. Our classifier provides perfect classification
results (i.e., for all 10/10 traces) for about a third of all
websites. Note that this is significantly lower than the 78.1%
we obtained based only on DNS sequences—a single wrong
classification will decrease this number. If we relax the ratio
of correct classification per website, e.g., to 80% of all DNS
sequences, we can already classify about three out of five
websites correctly—purely based on encrypted and padded
DNS traffic.
2) Scenario 2: Open World: We now turn to the open world
scenario, which restricts the attacker to train only on a subset
of all websites that the victim will visit. Effectively, the open
world scenario allows us to measure the False Positive Rate
(FPR) of our classifier. To obtain realistic results, we first have
to take two precautions.
First, note that the training and test partitions of the dataset
are disjoint. This means that every label our classifier assigns
to traces in the test dataset is a false positive. Consequently, we
turn to the second variant of our k-NN classifier that foresees
a threshold function thres that can neglect classification can-
didates based on their normalized absolute distance (cf. Sec-
tion IV-D2). Normalization is important, as the edit distance
tends to have higher absolute values for longer sequences.
Therefore, in the threshold function, we normalize the distance
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Fig. 3. Classification results in the closed world scenario, depending on the
number of Msg entries in the DNS sequence.
by dividing through the sequence length:
threst(u, ds) =
{
1 distance(u,ds)max(|u|,|ds|) > t
0 else
The parameter t is the threshold allowing us to change the level
of our classifier’s opportunism, which influences the FPR and
True Positive Rate (TPR). Higher thresholds favor a higher
TPR, yet will also lead to a higher FPR.
Second, the open world scenario is particularly sensitive
to several websites in the test dataset that provide too little
entropy, as their DNS sequences are too short. For example, a
website without any third-party resources causes only one (or
maximum two, in case of redirection to the www-subdomain)
DNS request. Given that the DNS sequences for websites
that share such non-distinctive behavior look identical, it is
impossible to classify these low-entropy websites correctly.
The stacked bar chart in Fig. 3 illustrates this. It reveals that
the ratio of correct classifications is extremely low, and almost
zero for sequences with at most three DNS messages. The
longer the DNS sequence, the higher its entropy, and the higher
chances for good classification results.
An attacker can thus use the length of a DNS sequence
to approximate the classification quality. In other words, they
can neglect “too short” DNS sequences, given their high risk of
false classifications. To reflect this, we regard DNS sequences
up to a length of six as non-classifiable, which are all sequence
lengths for which the successful classification ratio in the
closed world scenario was below 20% (see Fig. 3). This affects
4285 (4.7%) sequences, of which 355 and 3930 sequences
are in the training and test split, respectively. We ignore them
during classification and do not assign any labels, i.e., they do
neither account as true positives nor as false positives.
Figure 4 shows how many websites were correctly classi-
fied in the open world scenario in at least 5/10 cases (y-axis)
and relates this to the FPR (x-axis). We show k = 7, as this
performed best among all tested k values. The figure represents
a ROC curve with a step size of 5% FPR and plots FPR and
TPR when varying the maximum distance threshold. If we
tolerate an FPR of 10%, we can correctly classify 40% of the
websites in at least half of the cases. Recall at this point that
we operate on padded and encrypted data, and merely inspect
the DNS traffic. Yet, the small remaining entropy still allows us
Fig. 4. ROC curve showing TPR and FPR when varying the maximum
distance threshold (Open World Scenario); k = 7.
Fig. 5. Average of classifying partially cached DNS traces using a model
trained on non-cached data and vice versa (Scenario 3); k = 9. Error bars
show the variance of results.
to deanonymize the browsing targets in many cases. The TPR
even raises significantly higher for a slightly higher FPR, e.g.,
61% TPR with 20% FPR. The lower the maximum distance
threshold (i.e., the lower the FPR), the better the classifier
performs purely based on unanimous votes—spurred by the
fact that the stricter threshold discards neighbors with wrong
labels. However, lower thresholds also mean that potentially
correct neighbors fall above the distance threshold, which
significantly lowers the TPR compared to the closed world
scenario that operated without a threshold.
3) Scenario 3: Cache Effects: Finally, we use the closed
world scenario to evaluate if partial DNS caching will confuse
a sequence-based classifier. As described in Section V-A, we
have collected two DNS sequence datasets, one with preloaded
TLDs only, and the other (“caching dataset”) with additional
popular third-party domains. In a first experiment, we will train
on the non-cached dataset, and test on the caching dataset. We
repeat the experiment with training and test dataset swapped
and report the average. Figure 5 summarizes the results for
k = 9, which fared better here. The drop in accuracy becomes
clear when comparing to the closed-world evaluation in Fig. 2
that used a single cache level both for training and testing. Only
about 20% of the websites were classified correctly in at least
5/10 cases, which is far below the 80% TPR in Scenario 1.
To solve this problem, an attacker can train on both a
cached and a non-cached dataset. This reflects the situation
in which the attacker does not know whether a client has
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Fig. 6. Classifying both partially cached and non-cached DNS traces using
a model trained on non-cached and cached data; k = 9 (Scenario 3, second
part).
cached entries, and wants to be prepared for either situation.
We thus repeat the aforementioned experiment, but use a
combined dataset of now 20 DNS sequences per website.
Figure 6 shows the results for website classification for a fixed
k = 9 using the same 10-fold cross-validation used so far. For
the combined dataset, accuracy again increases to reasonable
levels. In fact, the results are even slightly better than in
Scenario 1. This can partially be explained with the smaller
dataset size of 8764 compared to 9205 for Scenario 1, which
tends to improve classification results. Another aspect could
be the fact that having more DNS sequences in the training
dataset simplifies finding neighbors using k-NN, as there are
more correct neighbors to choose from. Overall, the results
demonstrate that caching inaccuracies can be compensated for
if the training dataset combines traces obtained from both
cached and non-cached website visits.
E. DNS Message Trace Extraction: Dnstap vs. PCAP
To ease our internal processing for the various experiments,
we have so far extracted DNS message traces using the dnstap
interface of Unbound. However, in practice, an on-path attacker
would not have this capability. Instead, they would need to
extract DNS message traces from network traffic, as described
in Section IV-C. As a final experiment, we want to assess
if message trace extraction from network traffic (in particular,
PCAP traces) weakens the attacker capabilities. We thus repeat
the closed-world scenario and simultaneously record dnstap
and PCAP data. We then use each dataset to train a classifier,
and finally, compare the classification results between them.
The experimental setup already foreshadows the setting of
the upcoming section. Instead of having Unbound communi-
cate directly with Cloudflare, as described in Section V-B,
we add two DoT proxies. First, we add stubby [51] to the
container, which ensures that the DNS queries follow good
privacy practices. Second, we add a tiny self-written proxy,
which—for this experiment—directly forwards all messages
without delaying or altering them. In general, we will later
use this second proxy to evaluate different mitigations (cf. Sec-
tion VI-B). Both run inside each Docker container and listen
on the loopback interface. The PCAP data is captured before
it leaves the Docker network.
Table II shows the comparison between the PCAP and
TABLE II. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS (k = 7) BETWEEN TRACES
EXTRACTED FROM DNSTAP AND FROM PCAP FILES.
x/10 Traces per Domain dnstap in % pcap in %
1/10 8338 90.2 8229 89.0
2/10 8257 89.3 8044 87.0
3/10 8180 88.5 7828 84.7
4/10 8087 87.5 7535 81.5
5/10 7974 86.3 7188 77.8
6/10 7810 84.5 6742 72.9
7/10 7578 82.0 6112 66.1
8/10 7221 78.1 5265 57.0
9/10 6639 71.8 4158 45.0
10/10 5491 59.4 2520 27.3
dnstap-based classification results. During this run, we col-
lected traces for 9244 domains and again ten traces per domain.
The table compares the classification results for a fixed k = 7
and shows how many traces per domain we could correctly
classify. The PCAP classification performs slightly worse than
the dnstap results, which was expected, and can be partially
attributed to our proxy setup. Arguably, having four different
programs involved in the DNS resolution process will have
an impact on the stability of the timing data we can gather.
However, in general, the experiment shows that also on-path
attackers that have to extract DNS traces from network traces
remain powerful attackers. In fact, the difference for domains
for which at least 5/10 traces were correctly classified is only
8.5%. While this is indeed a significant difference, in this
example, on-path attackers can still classify 77.8% correctly.
We thus argue that using dnstap data does not invalidate the
general message of our experiments.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
In the last section we showed that attacks based solely
on encrypted DNS traffic are feasible and can be successful.
We first analyze in which directions countermeasures need to
be developed by understanding the impact of the two major
feature types (size and timing) of our classifier. Based on these
insights, we then describe potential mitigations.
A. Evaluating Perfect Mitigations
Our classifier uses two major feature types: packet sizes
and timing information. We thus first test which feature type
provides the most entropy, such that we can develop appro-
priate countermeasures. To this end, we perform a thought
experiment in which we assume a perfect defense for either
feature type, i.e., we assume we had a perfect padding scheme
and a perfect timing defense, respectively. We simulate per-
fect padding by removing any Msg elements from the DNS
sequences, thus removing any information about the packet
sizes. We keep Gap elements of size 0, to keep the overall
message count as a feature. Simulation of a perfect timing
defense works analogously. Here, we remove all Gap elements,
which is the classifier’s only source for timing information.
We re-run the closed world classification (Scenario 1)
with these modifications and compare the results in Fig. 7.
The figure shows the pseudo-plurality results for all three
variants, which we identified as the most promising tie-
breaking strategy. We see a large drop in performance for
both simulations, which is expected, as the entropy drastically
decreases. However, when comparing both perfect mitigations,
we observe a stark difference. Most importantly, we observe
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Fig. 7. Comparison between our classifier (baseline; blue), a simulated
perfect timing defense (orange), and a simulated perfect padding scheme
(green). Numbers are not stacked.
that even ignoring all packet size information (i.e., perfect
padding) does not entirely destroy the classifier’s performance.
As expected, the TPR significantly drops from its original
level of 78%, yet only to slightly below 40%. This shows
that the inter-arrival timings of the DNS responses in the
sequences carry significant entropy that can be leveraged to
classify encrypted and perfectly-padded DNS traffic.
In contrast, a perfect timing-based defense destroys the
classification results. This illustrates that the DNS traces’
entropy plummets if we remove timing information. In fact, it
also shows how little information the sizes of padded DNS re-
sponses carry. This can be nicely illustrated by the distribution
of message sizes in the closed world dataset. An overwhelming
99.81% of messages are 468B large. Additionally, all queries
were padded to the smallest size of 128B, which is why we
excluded them from our feature set right away. This situation
is only slightly different if the stub resolver enables DNSSEC.
DNSSEC will trigger signature and DNSKEY records that
increase the size of responses such that they carry at least
some entropy, i.e., in the 936B to 1404B range. At this point,
however, we are not aware of any popular stub resolver that
enables DNSSEC validation by default. We thus chose not to
report on DNSSEC-enabled numbers, although their increase
in size entropy would favor our classifier.
From these observations with the proposed two optimal
countermeasures we can derive important novel insights. First,
the currently proposed padding strategy [19] is indeed a good
compromise between overhead and the maximum privacy guar-
antees that an optimal padding could guarantee. Yet, second,
even an optimal padding strategy does not decrease the trace’s
entropy to a satisfactory level that preserves user privacy.
Third, countermeasures should also take into account timing
information, as timing has proven to contribute significant
entropy in DNS sequences.
B. Evaluating Practical Mitigations
Based on these observations, we now implement two
practical mitigations and measure their efficacy and efficiency.
To this end, we select two popular defenses that hide timing
information, namely a constant-rate scheme [17] and Adaptive
Padding [47], and apply them to encrypted DNS.
Constant-Rate Sending: Constant-rate schemes (CR) send
a packet on a fixed schedule every xms. The packet is
filled with payload, if some is waiting, otherwise it contains
padding data. CR entirely removes the entropy in inter-arrival
times, as they become constant. However, the proposal creates
significant bandwidth overhead, as every xms a packet must
be sent, even if no payload is waiting. Choosing a larger x
to reduce bandwidth overhead, however, impacts latency, as
payload may have to wait for a slot before it can be sent.
Finally, CR requires a termination condition to avoid infinite
transmissions of padding packets if no payload has to be
sent. This termination condition is randomized, so as not to
leak how long the transmission of real payload took. In our
implementation, we define a probability p, which specifies how
likely it is, that a dummy packet is added after the end of the
stream. This probability is sampled independently every time
a dummy packet is sent. In other words, with probability 1−p
at each interval, we terminate the CR stream and stop sending
dummy packets.
Adaptive Padding: Adaptive Padding (AP) [47] and its
improvement WTF-Pad [31] mitigate timing side-channels by
ensuring that the statistical timing features remain indistin-
guishable. We focus on AP instead of WTF-Pad, as AP is a
client-side only solution and does not require changes to the
DoT/DoH server. To hide timings, AP models a distribution of
inter-arrival times and sends payload and padding according
to the distribution. AP uses a state machine to control when
packets are transmitted. It switches between three states:
1) an idle state in which no packets are transmitted,
2) waiting, representing a gap between bursts, and
3) generate a dummy burst with padded packets.
A burst is a quick succession of multiple packets. The waiting
and burst states are controlled by statistical timing information,
which need to be extracted from real traffic samples, such
that the timing is realistic. We use our closed-world dataset
to extract inter-burst gaps (for waiting) and intra-burst gaps
(for burst). When forwarding a payload packet, AP transitions
to state waiting. Similar to our CR implementation, AP also
stops transmitting after longer times of inactivity, thus reducing
the bandwidth consumed by dummy packets. That is, with
probability p (as above), AP creates a dummy burst with a
length chosen from the statistical distribution in the modeled
data set, otherwise the state falls back to idle.
Comparing AP with CR: While both aim to hide timing
information, AP and CR have different effects on the classi-
fication accuracy and result in different overheads. We will
now compare the two approaches regarding these two aspects.
To this end, we create an experimental setup that allows us
to measure the schemes in varying configurations. We first
implement a DoT proxy that we place between Unbound
and the DoT server, which provides these mitigations on
the client side. The proxy uses a 128B sized query which
generates a 468B response for padding, since we observed
this combination in 99.81% of the cases. Second, we test how
much the countermeasures can mitigate privacy attacks against
encrypted DNS. Technically, we simulate their effect on our
DNS sequences, which allows for rapid testing of different
parameter configurations without regenerating traces.
To compare the approaches, we use our normal 10-fold
10
Fig. 8. Comparison of the overhead between AP and CR. The x-axis shows
time overhead and y-axis the packet overhead compared to the baseline at
1. A full circle represents 10% correctly labeled domains (≥ 5/10 traces
correct). The “pillars” of circles correspond to the different configurations
and are left-to-right in the same order as the legend.
cross-validation setup, and for each experiment vary the packet
rate xms (for CR) and the probability p (for CR and AP). We
test CR with four packet rates of one packet every 12ms,
25ms, 50ms, or 100ms. For both CR and AP, the probability
p takes values from 0.5 to 0.9 in 0.1 increments, where
larger p values provide better privacy, yet worse overhead. We
measure three effects: i) the bandwidth overhead in additional
DNS messages/bytes, ii) how much longer the DNS resolution
process takes, and iii) how well the classification works after
applying the mitigations. We can measure the bandwidth
overhead either in packets or in bytes, and we chose packets. In
our case they are basically identical, since the DNS messages
are padded to mostly equal sizes. Timing overhead only applies
to CR, which can delay sending from, while AP always sends
payload without any delay. The time for the DNS resolution
process is measured as the difference between the time of last
DNS response and of the first DNS response, while ignoring
responses created due to the dummy queries. We ignore the
responses to the dummy queries, as these do not add any
overhead from a user’s perspective, since these are not caused
by the user/browser, but solely by the DoT proxy.
Figure 8 shows the classification results. The figure is color
coded with AP being blue (left-most column of circles) and
constant-rate in the remaining colors. The x-axis shows the
time overhead as a factor compared to the baseline of no
modification. A value of 1 indicates no overhead. Similarly, the
y-axis measures the overhead in the number of DNS messages
with 1 being the baseline. The size of the colored slice of each
circle represents the classification results. A full circle is equal
to a 10% classification success in the 5/10 traces correctly
classified setup, and smaller pie slices represent proportionally
weaker classification scores. Multiple results with varying p
values are directly above each other and form a “pillar” of
circles. Circles higher up in each pillar have the largest p
values, circles towards the bottom have the lowest p values.
All variations are successful in mitigating our classifier, yet
differ in the overhead they create. In general, when comparing
the two approaches at similar defense strength, AP has a higher
bandwidth overhead compared to low-rate CR, while CR has
a higher timing overhead. AP can only be configured in one
dimension: As expected, lowering p also decreases defense
strength, but improves bandwidth overhead. By design, AP
outperforms CR w.r.t. low timing overhead, and since it gives
similar privacy guarantees, can be seen as the preferred choice
for devices that are not constrained in bandwidth. For example,
AP with p = 0.4 only leaves 5.8% domain classifications
intact, however, incurs a query overhead of 32.2%. In contrast,
the timeout-aware CR variant can be tweaked in two dimen-
sions limit the bandwidth overhead. Slow packet rates and low
p values result in relatively small bandwidth overheads, but at
the trade off of larger timing overhead. Thus, when bandwidth
is of a concern, such as for mobile devices, CR with slower
sending rates is probably preferred over AP. For example, using
CR with 100ms interval and p = 0.4 results in 19.1% time
overhead on average, and allows only 2.7% of the domains
be classified correctly.
C. Other Mitigations
Following our in-detail evaluation of the two selected
countermeasures (AP and CR), we will now briefly describe
further orthogonal countermeasures to thwart our attack.
Timing-based Mitigations: A variation of the constant-
rate scheme is limiting the number of unanswered queries to
one and requiring that there is always a query in-flight, creating
a half-duplex channel. Walkie-Talkie [55] uses this strategy. A
half-duplex channel has advantages for HTTP communication
compared to constant-rate, as the bandwidth is not limited.
This is mostly insignificant for DNS because, as we already
saw, most DNS queries fit into a single IP packet and will
be transferred in a single packet, thus corresponding to the
constant-rate scheme with x set to the round-trip time between
DNS client and resolver.
Hiding DNS traffic: We assumed that an attacker can
identify DNS flows in traffic captures and extract DNS mes-
sage sizes and inter-arrival times. Identifying DNS flows is
currently simple, as they are identifiable by their IP address,
port number, or TLS handshake. DoH has the potential to
be censorship resistant, as the DNS resolver can be hosted
at the same IP address as other benign content, such as a
large, non-blockable Content Delivery Network (CDN). A
browser could use the same HTTPS connection to access both
content and DNS. In such a setup it is not straightforward to
correctly separate the DNS from other traffic, thus preventing
any DNS-based fingerprinting attacks. Co-hosting DNS with
other content is the extreme case, but teaching DNS clients to
simulate browser TLS handshakes and using non-suspicious
ports like 443 would complicate detection already.
Morphing: Finally, approaches similar to traffic morph-
ing [31], [47], [55], [56] are conceivable also in the DNS
setting. Traffic morphing thwarts fingerprinting by transform-
ing the statistical features of websites such that they fall into
anonymity sets together with other websites, thus confusing
the classifier. In our terminology, we would aim to transform
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the DNS sequence of a website into the sequence of another
website. In principle, this is feasible, and an interesting di-
rection for future work. In fact, we could add queries to the
DNS sequences (at client side), or prolong inter-arrival times
(at server side)—both without causing harm to the client’s
functionality. While this would add a slight communication
delay, added queries could even be reasonably used to pre-
fetch cached records that would expire soon.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR): A stronger notion
of privacy is achieved by using PIR, in which the DNS resolver
is untrusted and the queries must be hidden from it. On the
one hand, our threat model assumes that the DNS resolver is
trusted. On the other hand, all schemes which achieve PIR are
transferable to our setup, as the DNS resolver is always in
a stronger position than a passive network attacker. Zhao et
al. [57] try to implement a PIR scheme using “range queries”.
They analyze the privacy properties in a setup of individual
queries. The scheme is insecure in a Web browsing context, due
to dependencies of consecutive queries, as shown by Herrmann
et al. [23]. Another approach is PageDNS [3] in which DNS
records are grouped into pages based on common hash prefixes
or popularity of the record. Lookups occur on a per page level
and hide the exact domain.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our work is an important contribution to understand the
privacy threats that DNS users face and how they can be
protected. Analyzing new side-channel attacks becomes more
important, as there is a general trend for more encryption that
aims to mitigate (obvious) privacy breaches. We see this trend
in the increasing adoption of HTTPS and newer encryption
standards like TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 is the first version which
encrypts the server’s certificate instead of sending it in plain
text. This provides the basis to fix another domain leak in
the TLS handshake due to the SNI extension, which tells the
server which domain the client wants to visit. There is ongoing
work by CDN operators and browser vendors to encrypt the
SNI [45] and prototypes are deployed [18].
This leaves DNS as an important target for snooping on
the privacy of users. This is because DNS is used as a first
step to connect to Internet services and can thus leak the target
a user visits. Given that we constrained ourselves to encrypted
and padded DNS traffic, we find the provided classification
results quite alarming. We can partially deanonymize 93.3% of
websites and correctly classify 78.1% of DNS sequences. The
foremost goal of our study, assessing the privacy guarantees of
encrypted DNS, was thus successful, as we have shown drastic
privacy problems. The classification accuracy can be further
boosted by combining our approach with existing Website
Fingerprinting (WF) methodologies (possibly on non-DNS
traffic), some of which we discuss in Section VIII. Having said
this, there are some limitations to our proposed methodology,
which we will describe next.
Choice of Classifier/Features: We used k-NN, a conserva-
tive choice of a classifier, which however is easy to understand
and reason about. k-NN can be slow on large training datasets,
which might be prohibitive in practice. Popular alternative
approaches, such as support vector machines and neural net-
works, require less human feature engineering to work and
might be faster during testing.
Datasets: We use a rather extensive dataset with 9205
websites in the closed world dataset. Related WF attack papers
regularly use a much smaller number of websites in their
datasets, in the range of tens to hundreds [21], [41], [50].
A larger dataset causes precision and recall to decline [41,
Fig. 10], which means our results would shine better on
datasets of identical size to these papers. In fact, we noticed
this positive effect already in the evaluation of Section V-D3.
DNS Traffic Identification and Extraction: The approach
to extract a DNS sequence from network captures assumes
DNS servers are identifiable as such. While DoT helps here, by
specifying a dedicated TLS port, DoH uses the default HTTPS
port. So far, most DoH servers have their own dedicated IP
addresses, e.g., 1.1.1.1. This does not necessarily have to
be the case as we already have addressed in Section VI-C.
Similarly, we assumed that we can perfectly extract mes-
sage sizes from the TLS/HTTPS stream. This was made
possible by the current DoT/DoH implementations, which try
to use small TLS records to transmit the data, by either using
a single TLS record for a DNS reply or by matching the
TLS record size to the TCP maximum transmission unit. In
principle, DNS messages could be transmitted in many tiny
or equally sized TLS records, hampering attempts of exact
message size extraction, but increasing the cost due to more
processing and network overhead.
User Modeling: For the purpose of our experiments, we
modeled a certain user behavior, which however might deviate
in practice. First, we assumed the client is waiting until
the website has fully loaded without any background DNS
traffic. When leaving the website earlier, DNS sequences might
be shorter than measured by us. Second, most evaluations
were performed with an empty browser cache and a DNS
cache, which only included the effective TLDs, expect for the
experiments where we determine the impact of caching. In
practice, users may have various levels of cached DNS entries,
which would then result in slightly varying DNS sequences. In
addition, web resources that are shared between websites might
be cached by the browser, such as jQuery or analytics libraries,
which would suppress DNS queries. While such partial caching
may decrease the classifier’s accuracy, one could argue that a
stateful adversary can use our attack to model the DNS cache
state of a user. Knowing the (approximate) cache contents
of each user, adversaries can adapt the training datasets by
retraining on the traces that are expected with a certain cache
state. We plan to perform such analyses and an according
adaptation to our classifier in the future.
Lack of Entropy: We noticed that DNS-based classifica-
tion of structurally less complex websites fails due to a lack
of entropy. This affects websites without third-party resources,
but we also noticed similar problems for some CDNs. While
this is an inherent problem of DNS-based classification indeed,
we argue that the continuing rise of complexity of websites will
mitigate this limitation over time.
This restriction also limits the ability to transfer this attack
to other domains. Web browsing is quite unique in how it
triggers diverse DNS request chains. Other uses, such as the
ones discussed in the background section (Section II) often
cause fewer and more independent requests, which makes it
hard to build DNS sequences with enough entropy.
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VIII. RELATED WORK
We now survey research that relates to the privacy of DoT
and DoH, website fingerprinting, and DNS-based tracking.
A. DNS Privacy
The DPRIVE working group [15] aims at “providing
confidentiality to DNS transactions” and thus proposed both
DoT (RFC 7858 [26]) and DoH (RFC 8484 [24]). These RFCs
mention traffic analysis as a potential attack and suggest
padding as a countermeasure. Daniel Gillmor then analyzed
the trade-off between padding overhead and privacy gain in
the context of individual query/response pairs [19], which led
to the padding policies (RFC 8467 [38]) that are the subject
of our work. We assess this general threat model to encrypted
DNS in a Web setting. We show that attackers can leverage
dependencies between DNS requests to perform side-channel
analysis that go beyond the transaction-wise classification by
Gillmor. In fact, we show that padding alone is insufficient
to preserve privacy in encrypted DNS, which contradicts the
findings and suggestions of Gillmor. This argument is agnostic
to the specific proposal. Our work thus also affects DNS
encryption schemes other than DoT/DoH.
Siby et al. [49] analyzed the privacy of DoH. They report
that their initial results indicate that domain classification in
encrypted DNS is possible. Their short paper does not provide
sufficient details to allow for a full comparison with our
approach. The features are similar: size, timing, and ordering,
where ordering is implicit in our (ordered) DNS sequence.
One important and crucial difference is that they do not work
on padded data. As such, their approach does not necessarily
withstand existing (and deployed) countermeasures. They re-
port that size alone can be a distinguishing feature, whereas
we show that timing has higher entropy and is vital for
classification of padded encrypted traffic.
Shulman studied the “pitfalls of DNS encryption” [48]. She
analyzed DNSCurve [12] and DNSCrypt [11], two DNS over
TLS proposals (both different from DoT) and opportunistic
IPsec. In a strict threat model, Shulman shows that an indistin-
guishability privacy definition is unachievable. If the attacker
can select two domains, one of which the client requests, and
can monitor the authoritative servers, it is easy to detect which
domain the client picked. Any side channel, be it IP address,
size, or response time, can be used to differentiate. Since
the attacker controls the domains, they can always choose a
pair of domains which are distinguishable. In contrast to our
threat model, Shulman follows an overly strict privacy defini-
tion. Allowing the attacker to choose the domains is a very
strong assumption and, in a fully encrypted Web, unrealistic.
Furthermore, the ability to differentiate between two attacker-
controlled domains is not particularly useful for an attacker. In
contrast, our goal, i.e., identifying which websites users visit,
is the core of user profiling.
B. Website Fingerprinting Attacks
In contrast to DNS traffic analysis, WF is a well-established
research field. A wide range of proposed classifiers suc-
cessfully reveal the websites from either encrypted traffic or
from traffic of anonymous communication networks (such
as Tor), including Support Vector Machines (SVM) [41],
[42], random forests [21], k-NN [54], and more recently,
neural networks [21], [46], [50]. The underlying features of
these approaches are often similar and include, among other
things, packet counts/sizes per direction, direction changes,
packet orderings, bursts, and inter-arrival times. Our k-NN
classifier borrows several features from the WF domain for
a new context. Yet, in contrast to WF approaches, we have to
restrict ourselves to DNS flows, which are significantly less
rich than HTTP(S) flows. In fact, one can argue that DNS
transactions typically trigger multiple HTTP transactions, and
such transactions (even if padded) have significantly higher
entropy than DNS messages padded to quantized size.
Greschbach et al. [20] use DNS to improve deanonymiza-
tion attacks against Tor users. Their proposal combines a WF
attack on the ingress node with capturing DNS messages on
Tor exit nodes. They measure how many autonomous systems
a query traverses to the DNS resolver, and determine that the
safest DNS option for exit nodes is their ISP’s DNS resolver.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply the
idea of sequence-based traffic analysis to deanonymize DNS
traffic. Indeed, plaintext DNS sequences have been used by
Wang et al. [53] as features to perform WF. However, they
assume access to the content of DNS queries, which allows for
trivial website inferences. We follow a much stricter attacker
model and infer the website from encrypted and padded DNS
traces by investigating timing-based and statistical features.
C. DNS-Based User Tracking
Non-encrypted DNS queries have also been abused to track
users, e.g., by Herrmann et al. [22] and Kirchler et al. [32].
They analyze how a passive adversary that intercepts traffic
between the user and DNS resolver or the DNS resolver
itself can track individual users even though their IP addresses
change. They show how behavior patterns of users can be used
to link user sessions with a high accuracy even over longer
periods of time. Our work is largely orthogonal to these papers,
since we assume that the DNS resolver is trusted and that the
connection between client and DNS resolver is encrypted.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Our work underlines the importance of carefully studying
the possibility of traffic analysis against encrypted protocols,
even if message sizes are padded. While there is a plethora
of literature on Website Fingerprinting based on HTTPS and
Tor traffic, we turned to encrypted DNS—an inherently more
complex context, given the low entropy due to short sequences
and small resources. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to show that passive adversaries can inspect sequences
instead of just single DNS transactions to break the widely
deployed best practice of DNS message padding. We plan to
share these novel findings with the respective working group
at the IETF to help standardize effective countermeasures that
go beyond the known transaction-based traffic analysis attacks.
We hope that our observations will foster more powerful
defenses in the DNS setting that can withstand even more
advanced traffic analysis attacks like ours.
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APPENDIX
DISTANCES BETWEEN TRACES
Fig. 9. Overview over the distances between traces of the same domain. The
traces are from the closed-world scenario. The orange line shows the minimal
distance between all 10 traces of a domain, while the blue line shows the
maximal distance. The black line displays the average of the minimal distances
for wrong classifications.
Fig. 10. Analogue to Fig. 9 but with normalized distances. Distances are
normalized by dividing the distance value by the length of the longer sequence.
In Section V-C we determined concrete values for our
distance function. Figure 9 shows the distance function for
the domains in our closed-world dataset, as specified in Sec-
tion V-A1. It shows the minimal (orange) and the maximal
(blue) distance between all ten traces of a domain. The do-
mains are sorted by the minimal distance. The black line shows
the average of the minimal distance for wrongly classified
traces.
From the graph we can see that we have a set of domains
with identical traces. There are 118 domains where all traces
are identical and 739 with at least two identical traces. The dis-
tances largely depend on the length of the sequence, which is a
consequence of our choice of using the Damerau-Levenshtein
distance.
Figure 10 shows the same as before, but with normalized
distances. We normalize the distance by dividing the value by
the length of the longer sequence as described in Section V-D2.
Here, we can see that the distances are much more uniform.
The quick increase of distance values towards the right side
of Fig. 9 is gone, which indicates that these large distances
belong to very long sequences and thus complex websites.
The average distance for wrong classifications is quite low,
since there are many wrong classifications with a distance of
exactly zero. This is a problem with simple websites without
many third-party resources, such that our DNS sequences are
small and identical across multiple domains. We address this
more in our discussion section (cf. Section VII).
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